We introduce a set of transformations on the set of all probability distributions over a finite state space, and show that these transformations are the only ones that preserve certain elementary probabilistic relationships. This result provides a new perspective on a variety of probabilistic inference problems in which invariance considerations play a role. Two particular applications we consider in this paper are the development of an equivariance-based approach to the problem of measure selection, and a new justification for Haldane's prior as the distribution that encodes prior ignorance about the parameter of a multinomial distribution.
Introduction
Many rationality principles for probabilistic and statistical inference are based on considerations of indifference and symmetry. An early expression of such a principle is Laplace's principle of insufficient reason: "One regards two events as equally probable when one can see no reason that would make one more probable than the other, because, even though there is an unequal possibility between them, we know not which way, and this uncertainty makes us look on each as if it were as probable as the other"(Laplace, Collected Works vol. VIII, cited after (Hacking 1975) ). Principles of indifference only lead to straightforward rules for probability assessments when the task is to assign probabilities to a finite number of different alternatives, none of which is distinguished from the others by any information we have. In this case all alternatives will have to be assigned equal probabilities. Such a formalization of indifference by equiprobability becomes notoriously problematic when from state spaces of finitely many alternatives we turn to infinite state spaces: on countably infinite sets no (countably additive) uniform probability distributions exist, and on uncountably infinite sets the concept of uniformity becomes ambiguous (as evidenced by the famous Bertrand's paradox (Holbrook & Kim 2000 , van Fraassen 1989 ).
On (uncountably) infinite state spaces concepts of uniformity or indifference have to be formalized on the basis of certain transformations of the state space: two sets of states are to be considered equiprobable, if one can be transformed into the other using some natural transformation t. This, of course, raises the sticky question what transformations are to be considered as natural and probabilitypreserving. However, for a given state space, and a given class of probabilistic inference tasks, it often is possible to identify natural transformation, so that the solution to the inference tasks (which, in particular, can be probability assessments) should be invariant under the transformations. The widely accepted resolution of Bertrand's paradox, for example, is based on such considerations of invariance under certain transformations. Also the uniform distribution on the real numbers is ultimately characterized (up to a constant factor) through its invariance under rigid motions.
In this paper we are concerned with probabilistic inference problems that pertain to probability distributions on finite state spaces. As indicated above, when dealing with finite state spaces there does not seem to be any problem of capturing indifference principles with equiprobability. However, even though the underlying space of alternatives may be finite, the object of our study very often is the infinite set of probability distributions on that space, i.e. for the state space S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } the (n − 1)-dimensional probability polytope
The objective of this paper now can be formulated as follows: we investigate what natural transformations there exist of ∆ n , such that inference problems that pertain to ∆ n should be solved in a way that is invariant under these transformations. In section 2 we identify a unique class of transformations that can be regarded as most natural in that they alone preserve certain relevant relationships between points of ∆ n . In sections 3 and 4 we apply this result to the problems of noninformative priors and measure selection, respectively.
Representation Theorem
The nature of the result we present in this section can best be explained by an analogy: suppose, for the sake of the argument, that the set of probability distributions we are concerned with is parameterized by the whole Euclidean space R n , rather than the polytope ∆ n . Suppose, too, that all inputs and outputs for a given type of inference problem consist of objects (e.g. points, convex subsets,. . . ) in R n . In most cases, one would then probably require of a rational solution to the inference problem that it does not depend on the choice of the coordinate system. Specifically, if all inputs are transformed by a translation, i.e. by adding some constant offset r ∈ R n , then the outputs computed for the transformed inputs should be just the outputs computed for the original inputs, also translated by r:
where i stands for the inputs and sol for the solution of an inference problem. Condition (1) expresses an equivariance principle: when the problem is transformed in a certain way, then so should be its solution (not to be confused with invariance principles according to which certain things should be unaffected by a transformation). The question we now address is the following: what simple, canonical transformations of the set ∆ n exist, so that for inference problems whose inputs and outputs are objects in ∆ n one would require an equivariance property analogous to (1)? Intuitively, we are looking for transformations of ∆ n that can be seen as merely a change of coordinate system, and that leave all relevant geometric structures intact. The following definition collects some key concepts we will use. DEFINITION 2.1. A transformation of a set S is any bijective mapping t of S onto itself. We often write ts rather than t(s). For a probability distribution
A distribution p is called a mixture of p and p if there exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that p = λp + (1 − λ)p (in other words, p is a convex combination of p and p ). A transformation t is said to
• preserve mixtures if for all p, p , p : if p is a mixture of p and p , then tp is a mixture of tp and tp .
The set of support of a distribution p ∈ ∆ n can be seen as its most fundamental feature: it identifies the subset of states that are to be considered as possible at all, and thus identifies the relevant state space (as opposed to the formal state space S, which may contain states s i that are effectively ruled out by p with p i = 0). When the association of the components of a distribution p with the elements of the state space S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } is fixed, then p and p with different sets of support represent completely incompatible probabilistic models that would not be transformed into one another by a natural transformation. In this case, therefore, one would require a transformation to preserve sets of support.
A permutation of ∆ n is a transformation that maps (p 1 , . . . , p n ) to (p π(1) , . . . , p π(n) ), where π is a permutation of {1, . . . , n}. Permutations preserve cardinalities of support, but not sets of support. Permutations of ∆ n are transformations that are required to preserve the semantics of the elements of ∆ n after a reordering of the state space S: if S is reordered according to a permutation π, then p and πp are the same probability distribution on S.
That a distribution p is a mixture of p and p is an elementary probabilistic relation between the three distributions. It expresses the fact that the probabilistic model p can arise as an approximation to a finer model that would distinguish the two distinct distributions p and p on S, each of which is appropriate in a separate context. For instance, p and p might be the distributions on S = {jam, heavy traffic, light traffic} that represent the travel conditions on weekdays and weekends, respectively. A mixture of the two then will represent the probabilities of travel conditions when no distinction is made between the different days of the week.
That a transformation preserves mixtures, thus, is a natural requirement that it does not destroy elementary probabilistic relationships. Note that we do not require that t preserves the mixture coefficient: when p = λp + (1 − λ)p then usually we will have tp = κtp + (1 − κ)tp with κ = λ. In fact, it is easy to see that only the identity function preserves both sets of supports and mixtures, such that the mixture coefficient is unchanged.
We now introduce the class of transformations that we will be concerned with in the rest of this paper. We denote with R + the set of positive real numbers.
Note that we have t r = t r if r is obtained from r by multiplying each component with a constant a > 0. We can now formulate our main result. THEOREM 2.3. Let n ≥ 3 and t be a transformation of ∆ n .
(i) t preserves sets of support and mixtures iff t ∈ T n .
(ii) t preserves cardinalities of support and mixtures iff t = t • π for some permutation π and some t ∈ T n .
The statements (i) and (ii) do not hold for n = 2: ∆ 2 can be identified with the interval [0, 1], and every monotone bijection of [0, 1] satisfies (i) and (ii). A weak form of a dual version of this theorem was already reported in (Jaeger 2001) . The proof of the theorem is given in appendix 6.1. The following examples illustrate how transformations t ∈ T n can arise in practice. EXAMPLE 2.4. In a study of commuter traffic the use of buses, private cars and bicycles is investigated. To this end, a group of research assistants is sent out one day to perform a traffic count on a number of main roads into the city. They are given count sheets and short written instructions. Two different sets of instructions were produced in the preparation phase of the study: the first set advised the assistants to make one mark for every bus, car, and bicycle, respectively, in the appropriate column of the count sheet. The second (more challenging) set of instructions specified to make as many marks as there are actually people traveling in (respectively on) the observed vehicles. By accident, some of the assistants were handed instructions of the first kind, others those of the second kind.
Assume that on all roads being watched in the study, the average number of people traveling in a bus, car, or on a bicycle is the same, e.g. 10, 1.5, and 1.01, respectively. Also assume that the number of vehicles observed on each road is so large, that the actually observed numbers are very close to these averages.
Suppose, now, that we are more interested in the relative frequency of bus, car and bicycle use, rather than in absolute counts. Suppose, too, that we prefer the numbers that would have been produced by the use of the second set of instructions. If, then, an assistant hands in counts that were produced using the first set of instructions, and that show frequencies
for the three modes of transportation, then we obtain the frequencies we really want by applying the transformation t r with r = (10, 1.5, 1.01). Conversely, if we prefer the first set of instructions, and are given frequencies generated by the second, we can transform them using r = (1/10, 1/1.5, 1/1.01).
This example gives rise to a more general interpretation of transformations in T n as analogues in discrete settings to rescalings, or changes of units of measurements, in a domain of continuous observables. EXAMPLE 2.5. Let S be a set of n possible diagnoses a doctor considers for one of his patients. After interviewing the patient and conducting several preliminary examinations, the doctor has arrived at a probability distribution p on S. He now performs another test T on the patient. For each s i ∈ S the doctor knows with certainty the probability that the test will give a positive result, given that s i is the correct diagnosis, i.e. he knows the probabilities
Observing a positive result, the doctor will update his initial probability assignment p i = P (s i ) to the new assignment p i := P (s i | T = pos) = r i P (s i )/P (T = pos). If the test cannot exclude any diagnosis with certainty, i.e. r i > 0 for all i, then p = t r p with r given by (2). Thus, the transformation t r describes the change induced on the probability assignment for the relevant state space S that is induced by conditioning on T = pos in the expanded state space S × {T = pos, T = neg} (a similar transformation describes the change induced by conditioning on T = neg).
Note that it is trivially true that the update from some particular prior p to a posterior p can be described by a transformation t r (provided p and p have the same set of support). The salient fact is that given the fixed probabilities (2), the transformation t r is the same for all priors p.
Noninformative Priors
Bayesian statistical inference requires that a prior probability distribution is specified on the set of parameters that determines a particular probability model. Herein lies the advantage of Bayesian methods, because this prior can encode domain knowledge that one has obtained before any data was observed. Often, however, one would like to choose a prior distribution that represents the absence of any knowledge: an ignorant or noninformative prior. The set ∆ n is the parameter set for the multinomial probability model (for a fixed sample size). The question of what distribution on ∆ n represents a state of ignorance about this model has received much attention, but no conclusive answer seems to exist.
Three possible solutions that most often are considered are: the uniform distribution, i.e. the distribution that has a constant density c with respect to Lebesgue measure, Jeffreys' prior, which is given by the density c i p
(where c is a suitable normalizing constant), and Haldane's prior, given by density i p −1 i . Haldane's prior (so named because it seems to have first been suggested in (Haldane 1932) ) is an improper prior, i.e. it has an infinite integral over ∆ n . All three distributions are Dirichlet distributions with parameters (1, . . . , 1), (1/2, . . . , 1/2), and (0, . . . , 0), respectively (in the case of Haldane's distribution, the usual definition of a Dirichlet distribution has to be extended so as to allow the parameters (0, . . . , 0)). Schafer (1997) considers all Dirichlet distributions with parameters (α, . . . , α) for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 as possible candidates for a noninformative prior.
The justifications for identifying any particular distribution as the appropriate noninformative prior are typically based on invariance arguments: generally speaking, ignorance is argued to be invariant under certain problem transformations, and so the noninformative prior should be invariant under such problem transformations. There are different types of problem transformations one can consider, each leading to a different concept of invariance, and often leading to different results as to what constitutes a noninformative prior (see (Hartigan 1964) for a systematic overview). In particular, there exist strong invariance-based arguments both for Jeffreys' prior (Jeffreys 1961) , and for Haldane's prior (Jaynes 1968 , Villegas 1977 . Novick and Hall (1965) derive Haldane's prior by a different type of argument. Skilling (1985) , on the other hand, rejects Haldane's prior because it remains improper when updated by unreliable observations. In the following, we present additional invariance-based arguments in support of Haldane's prior. EXAMPLE 3.1. (continuation of example 2.4) Assume that the true, long-term relative frequencies of bus, car, and bicycle use are the same on all roads at which the traffic count is conducted (under both counting methods). Then the counts obtained in the study are multinomial samples determined by a parameter f * 1 ∈ ∆ 3 if the first set of instructions is used, and f * 2 ∈ ∆ 3 if the second set of instructions is used. Suppose the project leader, before seeing any counts, feels completely unable to make any predictions on the results of the counts, i.e. he is completely ignorant about the parameters f * i . When the samples are large (i.e. a great number of vehicles are observed on every road), then the observed frequencies f obtained using instructions of type i are expected to be very close to the true parameter f * i . The prior probability Pr assigned to a subset A ⊆ ∆ n then can be identified with a prior expectation of finding in the actual counts relative frequencies f ∈ A. If this prior expectation is to express complete ignorance, then it must be the same for both sampling methods: being told by the first assistant returning with his counts that he had been using instructions of type 2 will have no influence on the project leader's expectations regarding the frequencies on this assistant's count sheet. In particular, merely seeing the counts handed in by this assistant will give the project leader no clue as to which instructions were used by this assistant.
The parameters f * i are related by f * 2 = t r f * 1 , where t r is as in example 2.4. Having the same prior belief about f * 2 as about f * 1 means that for every A ⊆ ∆ 3 one has Pr(A) = Pr(t r A). A noninformative prior, thus, should be invariant under the transformation t r . As the relation between f * 1 and f * 2 might also be given by some other transformation in T n , this invariance should actually hold for all these transformations.
This example provides one intuitive justification for requiring noninformative priors to be invariant under T n -transforms. The next theorem states that this invariance property only holds for Haldane's prior. In the formulation of the theorem a little care has to be taken in dealing with the boundary of ∆ n , where the density of Haldane's prior is not defined. We therefore restrict the statement of the theorem to the prior on the interior of ∆ n , denoted int∆ n .
THEOREM 3.2. Let Pr be a measure on int∆ n with Pr(int∆ n ) > 0 and Pr(A) < ∞ for all compact subsets A of int∆ n . Pr is invariant under all transformations t r ∈ T n iff Pr has a density with respect to Lebesgue measure of the form c i p −1 i with some constant c > 0.
Justifications for particular invariance concepts that are based on specific scenarios like the one described in example 3.1 always leave room for the possibility that different, similarly persuasive, scenarios can be constructed, which lead to different invariance concepts, and hence to different noninformative priors. It is therefore important that theorems 2.3 and 3.2 together provide a justification for Haldane's prior which is somewhat more robust (but also more abstract): any invariance-based justification for a different prior must be based on invariance under transformations that do not have the preservation properties of definition 2.1, and therefore can be argued to be less natural or basic than the transformations from which Haldane's prior is derived.
Since theorem 2.3 only is valid for n ≥ 3 (whereas theorem 3.2 also holds for n = 2), this justification, in principle, only applies for n ≥ 3 (though it would seem very unnatural to adopt Haldane's prior for n ≥ 3, and use some other prior for n = 2).
To conclude this section, we briefly review an earlier justification for Haldane's prior which was given by Jaynes (1968) . This justification is based on deriving a particular type of transformations from an intuitive scenario, very much as we did in example 3.1. It is developed by Jaynes only for n = 2, though it clearly generalizes to n ≥ 3. In the following we adopt Jaynes's notation and write (θ, 1 − θ) for a binomial distribution with "success probability" θ (rather than writing (p 0 , p 1 )).
The basis for Jaynes's justification is an intuitive interpretation of a noninformative prior as a distribution of beliefs about the true value of θ that one would find in "a population in a state of total confusion": according to this interpretation one assumes that there exists a population I of individuals i, and each individual believes the value of θ to be θ i ∈ [0, 1]. The distribution of beliefs in the population I, thus, gives rise to a density f (θ) on [0, 1]. This density can be interpreted as a noninformative prior when the individuals i ∈ I base their beliefs on "different and conflicting information", and, thus, the population as a whole is in a state of "total confusion".
Jaynes's argument then is that such a state of total confusion will remain to be the same when some piece of evidence E is given to all individuals, and each individual updates his or her beliefs by conditioning on E. By a suitable formalization of this scenario, Jaynes shows that a single individual's transition from an original belief θ to the new belief θ is given by
This can easily be seen as a transformation from our group T 2 (note the similarity between this derivation of a T 2 -transformation and our example 2.5). The assumption of a collective state of ignorance being invariant under assimilation of the evidence E leads to the condition of invariance of f under the transformation (3) 1 . Jaynes then proceeds to show that only Haldane's prior is invariant under these transformations (which is the special case n = 2 of our Theorem 3.2).
Equivariant Measure Selection
A fundamental probabilistic inference problem is the problem of measure selection: given some incomplete information about the true distribution p on S, what is the best rational hypothesis for the precise value of p? EXAMPLE 4.1. (continuation of example 2.4) One of the research assistants has lost his count sheet on his way home. Unwilling to discard the data from the road watched by this assistant, the project leader tries to extract some information about the counts that the assistant might remember. The assistant is able to say that he observed at least 10 times as many cars as buses, and at least 5 times as many cars as buses and bicycles combined. The only way to enter the observation from this particular road into the study, however, is in the form of accurate relative frequencies of bus, car, and bicycle use. To this end, the project leader has to make a best guess of the actual frequencies based on the linear constraints given to him by the assistant. EXAMPLE 4.2. (continuation of example 2.5) The doctor's distribution p on possible diagnoses will usually be the result of a measure selection process: each examination or test he performs on the patient will provide some partial information, e.g.: "(according to this test result) diagnosis s is twice as probable as diagnosis s ". All results combined leave the doctor with a set of possible distributions p consistent with his information. To decide on the best of a number of different therapies (potentially infinitely many -each associated with different success probabilities and side effects), however, the doctor has to choose a unique p to express his beliefs about the correct diagnosis.
The general formulation of the measure selection problem given above admits of a number of different more precise problem specifications. In particular, one can distinguish different variants of the general problem according to the nature of the distribution p, and the nature of the incomplete information available about p. Several solutions that have been proposed for the measure selection problem are based on quite different interpretations of p and incomplete information (Shore & Johnson 1980 , Paris & Vencovská 1990 , Jaeger 2001 . In order to clarify the role of the equivariance principle that we will propose as a desideratum for measure selection rules, we first take a closer look at these different interpretations.
Variants of the Measure Selection Problem
We first make some general assumptions on the purely mathematical form of incomplete information about p, and the measure selection problem: one assumption is that incomplete information consists of a set c = c 1 , . . . , c k of linear constraints on p, i.e. linear inequalities of the form
with real coefficients c i,j . This is quite a restrictive assumption on what types of incomplete information are to be considered, as it excludes e.g. independence constraints of the form "events A and B are independent". In spite of this restrictiveness, the limitation to linear constraints usually has to be made in order to make the measure selection problem at all feasible.
A set c of linear constraints defines the set ∆(c) ⊆ ∆ n of distributions that satisfy all constraints (the solution set of c). One possible mathematical formulation of the measure selection problem now is (Sel 1) define a selection function sel that maps sets c of linear constraints to nonempty subsets sel(c) ⊆ ∆ n .
This formalization, on the one hand, is very strong in that it requires sel to be defined for all, even inconsistent, sets of constraints; on the other hand it is very weak in that sel(c) is allowed to be a subset of ∆ n , rather than a unique element, and, moreover, it is not required that sel(c) ⊆ ∆(c) (which would be incompatible with the requirement that sel also is defined for inconsistent c). An alternative, more traditional formalization of the problem is (Sel 2) define a selection function sel that maps consistent sets c of linear constraints to points sel(c) ∈ ∆(c).
Identifying a set of constraints c with its solution set ∆(c), and generalizing from such polytopes to arbitrary closed and convex subsets A ⊆ ∆ n , one can finally put the problem in the following form:
define a selection function sel that maps nonempty, closed and convex subsets A ⊆ ∆ n to points sel(c) ∈ A.
Sel 1-3 are purely mathematical formalizations of the problem which do not directly represent any specific interpretations of the nature of p, or the constraints c. However, which of these formalizations is most appropriate is partly determined by the interpretation given to p and c. First turning to p, we can distinguish the cases that p represents a statistical, observable probability, or that p represents a subjective probability (degree of belief). These two different types of distributions give rise to two distinct interpretations of the "true" distribution p that we want to identify by measure selection: In the case of statistical probabilities the "true" p describes actual long-run frequencies, which, in principle, given sufficient time and experimental resources, one could determine exactly. In the case of subjective probability, the "true" p is a rational belief state that an ideal intelligent agent would arrive at by properly taking into account all its current, incomplete knowledge.
A second dichotomy arises through different interpretations of the nature of the constraints c: these can either be seen as a complete description of a state of information, or as randomly sampled pieces of (possibly unreliable) information. This distinction between constraints as knowledge and constraints as data was introduced in (Jaeger 2001) . It is a distinction that is independent from the distinction between statistical and subjective probabilities p. The following examples illustrate all four combinations of interpretations for p and c. EXAMPLE 4.3. (Statistical probabilities, constraints as data) Let p be a probability distribution in a medical domain that represents relative frequencies of certain diseases and symptoms. A linear constraint can, for instance, provide an upper bound on the probability of disease D given symptom S. We can now obtain a great number of such constraints by evaluating patient data from different hospitals and/or by interviewing numerous medical experts. Each individual constraint we elicit in this manner can then be seen as a randomly sampled piece of information on the true distribution p that describes the actual relative frequencies in the population we actually want to model. Note that constraints obtained in this manner can easily be inconsistent (patient data from different hospitals may show quite different conditional probabilities). Note, too, that we will probably have greater confidence in, and pay more attention to, constraints that we have observed multiple times (e.g. the conditional probability of D given S has been determined for many different hospitals, and similar values have been found in all cases) than "isolated" constraints (e.g. a conditional probability for D given S has only been mentioned by one expert, and not been corroborated otherwise).
EXAMPLE 4.4. (Statistical probabilities, constraints as knowledge) Let p be as in the preceding example, but now suppose that the constraints are obtained by systematically interviewing a single expert, for instance by requiring him to state for every possible conditional probability in the domain a best lower and upper bound, according to his knowledge.
EXAMPLE 4.5. (Subjective probabilities, constraints as data) Let p represent the subjective probabilities some European football enthusiast holds about the results in the upcoming champion's league season. Suppose we meet this fan at some late hour in the local pub, and that the conversation turns to football. Every now and then he will make a statement that, in effect, is a linear constraint on p: "Barcelona has at least twice the chance of reaching the finals that Madrid has", "I'd bet 10:1 that Bayern Munich will exit in the first round again -no, make that 20:1",. . . As in example 4.3, the constraints so obtained can be interpreted as randomly sampled pieces of evidence on the true beliefs p. As before, these constraints can be inconsistent, and we will pay greater attention to those constraints that have been consistently repeated several times. EXAMPLE 4.6. (Subjective probabilities, constraints as knowledge) Let p be the beliefs held by a professional bookmaker on the results in the upcoming champion's league season. Before the season starts, he offers certain odds on some possible bets, e.g. 10:1 that Madrid will reach the semifinals. Assuming the bookmaker to be rational, we can interpret these odds as constraints on his beliefs p (the probability that Madrid will reach the semifinals is at most 0.1).
As the bookmaker will aim to offer bets on all events for which he believes to have some reasonable probability assessment, and will also want to offer competitive odds, one can view the collection of bets he offers as a complete description of his state of knowledge.
Clearly, in any given situation it need not be obvious whether the constraints as data or constraints as knowledge interpretation is more appropriate -both interpretations are idealizations that will never be encountered in a pure form in reality. A good criterion by which one can judge which interpretation of the given constraints is the right one is to decide whether one should base measure selection on the raw set of observed constraints c, taking into account possible multiple occurrences of the same constraint, or whether ∆(c) alone already encodes all the relevant information provided by c. This also means that under the constraints as data interpretation the mathematical shape of the measure selection problem is (Sel 1), whereas under the constraints as knowledge interpretation (Sel 2) and (Sel 3) are more natural.
More important than the technicalities of the problem formalization, however, is the question whether the different interpretations for p and c will lead to completely different solution paradigms, or whether the same formal selection rules are appropriate in all cases. Paris (1994, n.d.) emphasizes that the principles he postulates for measure selection are meant to apply to subjective probabilities p and the constraints as knowledge interpretation only. In (Jaeger 2001) , on the other hand, it has been argued that the constraints as data perspective requires different selection principles than the constraints as knowledge perspective. This is already supported by the discussion of examples 4.3-4.6, where we saw that the constraints as data perspective leads to selection rules that must be sensitive to multiple occurrences of identical constraints, but under the constraints as knowledge perspective such multiplicities would be ignored.
However, in contrast to Paris, we see no reason to believe that measure selection for subjective probabilities should follow different principles than measure selection for statistical probabilities. This is supported by a uniform philosophical interpretation of measure selection for statistical and subjective probabilities: as already observed above, in the statistical case, the "true" p represents unobserved long-run frequencies. Measure selection for statistical probabilities can then be seen as a prediction on actual long-run frequencies that, in principle, one would be able to observe in a suitable experimental setup (or simply by making observations over a sufficiently long period of time).
Measure selection for subjective probabilities admits of a quite similar interpretation: following earlier suggestions of a frequentist basis for subjective probability (Reichenbach 1949 , Carnap 1950 , it is argued in (Jaeger 1995 ) that subjective probability is ultimately grounded in empirical observation, hence statistical probability. In particular, in (Jaeger 1995 ) the process of subjective measure selection is interpreted as a process very similar to statistical measure selection, namely a prediction on the outcome of hypothetical experiments (which, however, here even unlimited experimental resources may not permit us to carry out in practice). Under the uniform interpretation of statistical and subjective measure selection as a prediction of frequencies in (hypothetical) experiments, it seems reasonable that both selection processes should follow the same formal rules. This is furthermore supported by the observation that Shore and Johnson (1980) on the one hand, and Paris and Vencovská (1990) on the other hand, derive very similar principles for measure selection, but Shore and Johnson assumed statistical probabilities, whereas Paris and Vencovská consider subjective probabilities.
We can summarize our perspective on the measure selection problem by the following three hypotheses. The first two summarize the preceding discussion; the third is a combined result of the arguments in the following section 4.2, and arguments in (Jaeger 2001 ).
• Selection rules under the constraints as data interpretation are different from selection rules under the constraints as knowledge interpretation.
• Under either interpretation for the constraints, the same selection rules are applicable to statistical and subjective probabilities.
• The equivariance principle, introduced below, is applicable (in slightly dif-ferent forms) under both interpretations for the constraints.
Equivariance Principle
In the following we focus on the measure selection problem under the constraints as knowledge perspective, taking (Sel 3) to be its mathematical structure. We propose an equivariance principle for this setting. An analogous principle adapted to the constraints as data perspective and the mathematical form (Sel 1) is described in (Jaeger 2001) . Additional results relevant for the constraints as data case (including a dual version of the representation theorem that is more directly geared towards the needs of measure selection under constraints as data than the formulation of theorem 2.3) can be found in (Jaeger 2003b) .
The most widely favored solution to the measure selection problem under the constraints as knowledge interpretation is the entropy maximization rule: define sel me (A) to be the distribution p in A that has maximal entropy (for closed and convex A this is well-defined). Axiomatic justifications for this selection rule are given in (Shore & Johnson 1980 , Paris & Vencovská 1990 ). Both these works postulate a number of formal principles that a selection rule should obey, and then proceed to show that entropy maximization is the only rule satisfying all the principles. Paris (1999) argues that all these principles, in essence, are just expressions of one more general underlying principle, which is expressed by an informal statement (or slogan) by van Fraassen (1989) : Essentially similar problems should have essentially similar solutions.
In spite of its mathematical sound derivation, entropy maximization does exhibit some behaviors that appear counterintuitive to many (see (Jaeger 2001) for two illustrative examples). Often this counterintuitive behavior is due to the fact that the maximum entropy rule has a strong bias towards the uniform distribution u = (1/n, . . . , 1/n). As u is the element in ∆ n with globally maximal entropy, u will be selected whenever u ∈ A. Consider, for example, figure 1 (i) and (ii). Shown are two different subsets A and A of ∆ 3 . Both contain u, and therefore sel me (A) = sel me (A ) = u. While none of Paris' rationality principles explicitly demands that u should be selected whenever possible, there is one principle that directly implies the following for the sets depicted in figure 1: assuming that sel(A) = u, and realizing that A is a subset of A, one should also have sel(A ) = u. This is an instance of what Paris (1994) calls the obstinacy principle: for any A, A with A ⊆ A and sel(A) ∈ A it is required that sel(A ) = sel(A). The intuitive justification for this is that additional information (i.e. information that limits the previously considered distribution A to A ) that is consistent with the previous default selection (i.e. sel(A) ∈ A ) should not lead us to revise this default selection. While quite convincing from a default reasoning perspective (in fact, it is a version of Gabbay's (1985) restricted monotonicity principle), it is not entirely clear that this principle is an expression of the van Fraassen slogan. Indeed, at least from a geometric point of view, there does seem to exist little similarity between the two problems given by A and A , and thus the requirement that they should have similar solutions (or even the same solution) hardly seems a necessary consequence of the van Fraassen slogan.
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Figure 1. Maximum Entropy and Tn-equivariant selection
An alternative selection rule that avoids some of the shortcomings of sel me is the center of mass selection rule sel cm : sel cm (A) is defined as the center of mass of A. With sel cm one avoids the bias towards u, and, more generally, the bias of sel me towards points on the boundary of the input set A is reversed towards an exclusive preference for points in the interior of A. A great part of the intuitive appeal of sel cm is probably owed to the fact that it is translation equivariant, i.e.
(1) is satisfied with sol = sel cm and i = A.
Such an equivariance property can be understood as a much more direct formalization of the van Fraassen slogan than the individual postulates proposed in the derivations of the maximum entropy principle. Indeed, van Fraassen (1989) , after giving the informal slogan, proceeds to explain it further as a general symmetry requirement of the form
where A is the input to some inference problem, R is a solution rule for the problem, and h is some problem transformation (van Fraassen 1989, p.260) . This symmetry requirement, thus, is a very general principle that can be applied to many different types of inference problems. The equivariance principle (1) is a special form of (4) with h the translation by r. For our special measure selection problem we have that A is any closed and convex subset of ∆ n , and R is a selection rule. To apply van Fraassen's general symmetry requirement to our special problem, it thus remains to specify the transformation(s) h for which (4) should be required.
Appealing to theorem 2.3, we argue that the transformations in T n are the most relevant transformations to consider in our problem setting, so that we arrive at the following T n -equivariance principle for selection rules:
Figure 1 (iii)-(v) illustrates the T n -equivariance principle: shown are three different transformations A 1 , A 2 , A 3 of a polytope defined by three linear constraints, and the corresponding transformations p 1 , p 2 , p 3 of one distinguished element inside the A i . T n -equivariance now demands that sel(
The following example provides an intuitive justification for requiring T n -equivariant selection rules. EXAMPLE 4.7. (continuation of example 4.2) Let c be the set of constraints the doctor obtains through his initial interview and examinations. By a measure selection process he obtains the distribution p expressing his precise degrees of belief for the different diagnoses. Now he performs the test T and obtains a positive result. He now has two ways to combine this new evidence with his previous reasoning: he can first integrate the new evidence with his original partial information by conditioning each distribution q in A = ∆(c) on T = pos, thus obtaining a new set A = t r (A) of possible distributions, and then perform measure selection on A . Alternatively, he can simply condition his already selected distribution p on T = pos. If the doctor's measure selection rule is T n -equivariant, then both ways will lead to the same result p = t r p.
T n -equivariance imposes no restriction on what sel(A i ) should be for any single A i in figure 1. It only determines how the selections for the different A i should be related. This principle alone, thus, is far from providing a unique selection rule, like the rationality principles of Paris and Vencovská (1990) . On the other hand, we have not yet shown that T n -equivariant selection rules even exist. This will be the subject of the remainder of this section where we construct a concrete selection rule.
From (5) one immediately derives a limitation of possible T n -equivariant selection rules: let A = ∆ n in (5). Then t r A = A for every t r ∈ T n , and equivariance demands that t r sel(A) = sel(A) for all t r , i.e. sel(A) has to be a fixpoint under all transformations. The only elements of ∆ n that have this property are the n vertices v 1 , . . . , v n , where v i is the distribution that assigns unit probability to s i ∈ S. Clearly a rule with sel(∆ n ) = v i for any particular i would be completely arbitrary, and could not be argued to follow any rationality principles (more technically, such a rule would not be permutation equivariant, which is another equivariance property one would demand in order to deal appropriately with reorderings of the state space, as discussed in section 2).
Similar problems arise whenever sel is to be applied to some A ⊆ ∆ n that is invariant under some transformations of T n . To evade these difficulties, we restrict in the following the domain of sel to sets A that are not invariant under any transformation t r (except the identity transformation). Let A denote the set of closed and convex A that are contained in the interior of ∆ n (i.e. support(p) = {1, . . . , n} for all p ∈ A), and that have full dimension (i.e. the affine hull of A has dimension n − 1) 2 . One can show that A ∈ A are not invariant under any non-trivial t r ∈ T n (A is not the most general class of sets with this property, and the following construction can also be extended to more general classes).
We first consider the special case n = 2. We identify ∆ 2 with the interval [0, 1] via the mapping (p 0 , p 1 ) → p 0 . Then A consists of all closed intervals [l, u] with 0 < l < u < 1. Out of symmetry considerations, one will require from a selection rule that
One can show that for
is transformed by t r into a symmetric interval of the form [a, 1− a]. Both this symmetric transform and the transformation t r are unique for the given [l, u] .
Figure 2 illustrates the value of sel ([l, u] ) as a function of l for the two fixed values u = 0.5 and u = 0.99. ([l,0.5]) sel ([l,0.99]) Figure 2. T2-equivariant selection Thus, for n = 2 there exists a unique T 2 -equivariant selection rule that also satisfies (6). This uniqueness result, however, comes with two qualifications: first it must be remembered that theorem 2.3 does not apply for n = 2, so that T nequivariance does not carry the same weight for n = 2 as for n ≥ 3. Second, this uniqueness result only applies to the case where the input of the selection process is an interval [l, u] , i.e. we are here considering the form (Sel 3) of selection problem, which is appropriate under the constraints as knowledge only. Under the constraints as data interpretation, we have as possible inputs to the selection process arbitrary collections {l i | i = 1, . . . , k}, {u j | j = 1, . . . , l} of lower and upper bounds. For this more general class of inputs no uniqueness result holds.
Following basically the same construction leading to (7), we can define T nequivariant rules for n ≥ 3.
We begin by defining on A an equivalence relation ∼:
The equivalence class orb(A) := {A | A ∼ A} (= {t r A | t r ∈ T n }) is called the orbit of A (these are standard definitions). It is easy to verify that for A ∈ A also orb(A) ⊆ A, and that for every A ∈ orb(A) there is a unique t r ∈ T n with A = t r A. Suppose that sel(A) = p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ). With r = (1/p 1 , . . . , 1/p n ) then t r p = u, and by equivariance sel(t r A) = u. It follows that in every orbit there must be some set A with sel(A ) = u. On the other hand, if sel(A ) = u, then this uniquely defines sel(A) for all A in the orbit of A : sel(A) = p, where p = t r u with t r the unique transformation with t r A = A. One thus sees that the definition of an equivariant selection rule is equivalent to choosing for each orbit in A a representative A for which sel(A ) = u shall hold.
In the case n = 2 an orbit consists just of the set of all intervals [l, u] that can be transformed into the same symmetric interval [a, 1 − a], and this symmetric element is the orbit's representative A with sel(A ) = u.
For n ≥ 3 it is no longer so straightforward to identify the representative A , because now not every A ∈ A has a transform that is symmetric in a similarly strong sense as an interval [a, 1 − a]. For this reason there does not seem to exists a single principle like (6) that together with T n -equivariance determines a unique selection rule. However, we can generalize the intuition we followed in the n = 2 case by trying to identify, for each orbit, the 'maximally symmetric' representative A . In the following we base this identification on the condition that u is the center of mass of A .
For A ∈ A we denote with chm(A) the center of mass of A with respect to Haldane's prior H. Thus, p = chm(A) iff for i = 1, . . . , n:
Since A is full-dimensional, closed, and contained in the interior of ∆ n , one has 0 < H(A) < ∞, so that the p i are well-defined.
LEMMA 4.8. Let A ∈ A. There exists a unique A ∈ orb(A) with chm(A ) = u.
By this lemma the following is a well-defined selection rule for A ∈ A:
sel equiv-chm (A) = p :⇔ A = t r A , chm(A ) = u, and p = t r u.
It appears to be difficult to give a more direct definition of sel equiv-chm (A). In particular, it is not the case that sel equiv-chm (A) = chm(A) (the intuitively appealing rule sel(A) = chm(A) is not T n -equivariant).
In (Jaeger 2003a ) the same construction as given here was sketched using center-of-mass with respect to Lebesgue measure instead of Haldane's prior. While the analogue of lemma 4.8 might be expected to also hold for cm in place of chm, this appears to be much harder to prove, so that at this point it must be considered an open question whether the construction also works for cm.
Conclusions
Many probabilistic inference problems that are characterized by a lack of information have to be solved on the basis of considerations of symmetries and invariances. These symmetries and invariances, in turn, can be defined in terms of transformations of the mathematical objects one encounters in the given type of inference problem.
The representation theorem we have derived provides a strong argument that in inference problems whose objects are elements and subsets of ∆ n , one should pay particular attention to invariances (and equivariances) under the transformations T n . These transformations can be seen as the analogue in the space ∆ n of translations in the space R n . One should be particularly aware of the fact that it usually does not make sense to simply restrict symmetry and invariance concepts that are appropriate in the space R n to the subset ∆ n . A case in point is the problem of noninformative priors. In R n Lebesgue measure is the canonical choice for an (improper) noninformative prior, because its invariance under translations makes it the unique (up to a constant) "uniform" distribution. Restricted to ∆ n , however, this distinction of Lebesgue measure does not carry much weight, as translations are not a meaningful transformation of ∆ n . Our results indicate that the choice of Haldane's prior for ∆ n is much more in line with the choice of Lebesgue measure on R n , than the choice of the "uniform" distribution, i.e. Lebesgue measure restricted to ∆ n .
In a similar vein, we have conjectured in section 4 that some of the intuitive appeal of the center-of-mass selection rule is its equivariance under translations. Again, however, translations are not the right transformations to consider in this context, and one therefore should aim to construct T n -equivariant selection rules.
T n -equivariance, in this context, is furthermore supported by the intuitive desideratum that measure selection should permute with conditioning in an extended state space.
An interesting open question is how many of Paris and Vencovská's (1990) rationality principles can be reconciled with T n -equivariance. As the combination of all uniquely identifies maximum entropy selection, there must always be some that are violated by T n -equivariant selection rules. Clearly the obstinacy principle is rather at odds with T n -equivariance (though it is not immediately obvious that the two really are inconsistent). Can one find T n -equivariant selection rules that satisfy most (or all) principles except obstinacy?
6. APPENDIX
Proofs for Sections 2 -4
Theorem 2.3 Let n ≥ 3 and t be a transformation of ∆ n .
Proof: (i) For x ∈ (R + ) n we denote with [x] the linear subspace of R n generated by x. We use R n 1Q to denote the first quadrant of R n , i.e. the set of all points with only non-negative coordinates. With P n−1 we denote the set of all onedimensional linear subspaces of R n , i.e. the (n − 1)-dimensional projective space over R. Furthermore, with P n−1 1Q we denote the subset of P n−1 containing those subspaces that intersect R n 1Q not only in 0. Thus,
and, moreover, every [x] ∈ P n−1 1Q is uniquely represented by one p ∈ ∆ n . The transformation t, therefore, immediately induces a (bijective) transformation on P n−1 1Q , which, for simplicity, we also denote with t. The main part of the proof now consists of showing that t can be extended to a linear transformation t * of R n 1Q . The arguments used to establish this closely follow the proofs of the representation theorem for projective colineations (also known as the fundamental theorem of projective geometry) as given in (Faure & Frölicher 2000) and (Beutelspacher & Rosenbaum 1998) . That representation theorem states that every transformation t on P n−1 that preserves colinearity is induced by a linear transformation t * of R n . Here we show basically a version of this result that, on the one hand, is restricted to P n−1 1Q and R n 1Q , and, on the other hand, starts with the slightly stronger requirement of preservation of mixtures, rather than preservation of colinearity (the former requires also that the relative order of colinear points is preserved). The main work in adapting the proof of the representation theorem for colineations to our problem consists of making sure that all geometric constructions in the original proof can be contained within the subset P n−1 1Q . Since large parts of the resulting proof are virtually identical to the originals, we here give it in fairly condensed form.
We require some additional notation: [x, y] stands for the linear subspace generated by x and y. If x and y are linearly independent, this is a two-dimensional plane, which, in projective geometry terms, is the line connecting We prepare the main part of the proof with the following lemma (cf. lemmas 10.1.1 and 10.1.2 in (Faure & Frölicher 2000) ).
LEMMA 6.1. (A) Let x, y, z ∈ R n 1Q such that x, y are linearly independent, and z is a positive combination of x and y. Then there exists exactly onẽ
] be linearly independent, and let
Proof of lemma: (A) Independent from n, this is a statement only about the plane spanned by x, y, z. The construction ofỹ, therefore is illustrated in full generality by Figure 3. (B) x 1 + x 2 + x 3 is a positive combination of x 1 and x 2 + x 3 . It follows that t[x 1 + x 2 + x 3 ] is a positive combination of t[x 1 ] and t[x 2 + x 3 ], and that t[x 2 + x 3 ] is in the linear subspace generated by t[x 1 ] and t[x 1 + x 2 + x 3 ], i.e.
Analogously, one obtains
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xỹ Taking the intersections of the right hand sides of (9) and (10), respectively (11) and (12) 
We can now define t * : first, define t 
To show that z i = z j first consider the case that
. Applying part (B) of the lemma to x 1 = a i , x 2 = x, x 3 = a j and y 1 = b i , y 2 = z 1 , y 3 = b j , one obtains t[a j + x] = [b j + z i ] and hence by the uniqueness statement of part (A) of the lemma z i = z j .
In the case
we obtain from the linear independence of the
, so that z k is defined by our construction. Applying the first case twice we obtain z i = z k = z j .
We next proceed to show that t
Theorem 3.2 Let Pr be a measure on int∆ n with Pr(int∆ n ) > 0 and Pr(A) < ∞ for all compact subsets A of int∆ n . Pr is invariant under all transformations t r ∈ T n iff Pr has a density with respect to Lebesgue measure of the form c i p −1 i with some constant c > 0.
Proof:
We first show the invariance of distributions Pr given by densities g c (p) := c i p −1 i . It is sufficient to consider the case c = 1. We write g for g 1 . Furthermore, we may restrict attention to transformations t r given by vectors r with r i = 1 in all but one coordinate i. General t r can be obtained as compositions of such primitive transformations, and therefore the invariance of Pr under each primitive transformation implies invariance under all transformations. Moreover, without loss of generality, we may take r = (r, 1, . . . , 1). In the following we write t for this t r :
t(p) = 1/(rp 1 + n i=2 p i )(rp 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ).
Saying that a distribution Pr on ∆ n has density g means that ∆ n is identified as a subset of the n − 1-dimensional affine space L := {x ∈ R n | x i = 1}, and that g is a density with respect to n − 1-dimensional Lebesgue measure on this space. To simplify the parameterization of our problem, we can identify L with R n−1 via the embedding π : (x 1 , . . . , x n−1 , 1 − n−1 i=1 x i ) → (x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ).
This embedding is measure preserving up to a constant: for all measurable A ⊆ L with finite Lebesgue measure λ n−1 (A) we have λ n−1 (π(A)) = c n λ n−1 (A) with c n a constant depending on n. In particular, we have π(∆ n ) = {x ∈ [0, 1] n−1 | x i ≤ 1} =: D n−1 .
The distribution Pr induces a distribution πPr on int D n−1 given by the density f (x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ) := c n g(x 1 , . . . , x n−1 , 1 − n−1 i=1 x i ). The invariance of Pr under t is equivalent to the invariance of πPr under t π : (x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ) → 1/(1 + (r − 1)x 1 )(rx 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n−1 ).
We thus have transformed our original problem on ∆ n ⊆ L into a similar problem for D n−1 ⊆ R n−1 . To simplify notation, we write in the following again t for the reparameterized transformation t π , and Pr for the induced distribution πPr. According to the transformation theorem for integrals, the density of the transformed distribution t(Pr) is given by
where J t is the Jacobian matrix of t. We have to show that f t = f . For this, we first evaluate the Jacobian. With a := 1 + (r − 1)x 1 the partial derivatives of t are The Jacobian matrix, thus, is in lower triangular form, and its determinant is the product of the main diagonal elements:
| J t (x) |= r/a n .
For x ∈ D n−1 we can write with b := r + (1 − r)x 1 (= −a + r + 1):
t −1 (x) = r/b(x 1 /r, x 2 , . . . , x n−1 ). 
From (13), (16) and (17) now f t = f follows. The uniqueness assertion of the theorem follows from general results on the uniqueness of invariant measures (Halmos 1950, Sec.60,Theorem C) . For a straightforward application of these results it is only necessary to realize that ∆ n is a locally compact Hausdorff space, and that the condition Pr(A) < ∞ for compact A entails that Pr is regular (Cohn 1993, Proposition 7.2 
.3).
Lemma 4.8 Let A ∈ A. There exists a unique A ∈ orb(A) with chm(A ) = u.
Proof: In the following we denote with x, y the scalar product of vectors in R n . Assume that no t r ∈ T n with chm(t r A) = u exists. Let := inf{ chm(tA) − u | t ∈ T n }.
The infimum here is attained for some t ∈ T n , i.e. there exists B ∈ orb(A) with chm(B) − u = > 0. Let c := chm(B). We show that there exists t r ∈ T n with chm(t r B) − u < . With u, p = 1/n for all p ∈ ∆ n one obtains c−u, u = 0, and c−u, c = c, c − 1/n > 0. We show that there exists a set {r(δ) | δ ∈ [1/2, 2]} of parameters of transformations in T n such that t r(1) is the identity transformation, and f (δ) := c − u, chm(t r(δ) B)
is decreasing in δ with f (1) < 0. It follows that the parametric curve δ → chm(t r(δ) B) is as shown in Figure 4 , i.e. it intersects the -ball around u, which then contradicts the definition of B. Define From the definition of r(δ) it is immediate that c − u, t r(δ) p is decreasing in δ for all p ∈ ∆ n .
